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INTRODUCTION 
This matter is one regarding maintaining the terms of a contract and effective dispute 
resolution. Coet and Labrum entered into an asset sale agreement for the sale of a new car 
dealership with the terms spelled out in the agreement. The relevant terms of the agreement 
are the attorneys' fees and costs provision for the prevailing party for sums expended with 
or without suit, at trial, on appeal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. [R.416.] 
Additionally, this appeal will bring forth the issue of dispute resolution through Article VIII 
Utah State courts or alternative dispute resolution with the supervision of the courts. See 
Utah Constitution, Art VIII. Subsequent to Coet Chevrolet filing its complaint against 
Labrum Chevrolet, the parties stipulated and the trial court ordered and directed, a creative 
and effective alternative dispute resolution through a team of accountants (the "Evaluation 
Team") to research, evaluate and determine certain accounting matters included in the 
complaint, counterclaim and agreed-upon by the litigants. Labrum argues that the parties and 
the trial court agreed, through a written authorization and agreement to use an Evaluation 
Team, that they had the authority to determine legal issues. Specifically, Labrum argues that 
terms not included in the written authorization, unless specifically mentioned, were to be 
determined by the Evaluation Team. Ultimately, the legal issues are: (1) to determine if 
attorneys' fees were to be awarded and the amount, pursuant to the Asset Sale Agreement; 
and (2) if an award of pre-judgment interest and what that interest will be, regarding the 
Evaluation Team's determination of which party owed the other. 
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Coet asserts that the trial court erred in several of its determinations. The trial court 
erred in granting Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment precluding Coet from 
collecting his attorneys' fees and costs and the prejudgment interest due to him from Labrum. 
The trial court's decision comes despite the Evaluation Team's findings and award was in 
Coet favor, in excess of $59,000.00. After the trial of the remaining issues, the trial court 
failed to find in favor of Coet as the prevailing party. Instead, the trial court, erroneously 
determined Labrum to be the prevailing party and awarded Labrum his attorneys' fees and 
costs. The trial court only considered the issues litigated and awarded fees to Labrum. The 
trial court completely disregarded the vast sum awarded to Coet by the Evaluation Team, and 
only considered the approximately $11,000.00 Labrum was awarded after trial. 
Additionally, the court erred by finding Labrum met the evidentiary standard for Labrum's 
fraud claim, finding that Labrum relied upon an alleged comment made by Coet, refusing to 
acknowledge Labrum's experience, duty and that he had nearly completed the parts 
inventory. Lastly, the trial court erred in its finding that the certain 1992 Ford truck was in 
the inventory and worse allowed Labrum to take without compensating Coet for it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. LABRUM FAILS IN HIS ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THE ACCOUNTANTS' 
EVALUATION AGREEMENT AS AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION TO 
THE ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT, 
A. The Appropriate Standard Of Review For The Granting Of 
The Partial Summary Judgment Is "No Deference" And 
"Correctness." 
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Coet does not object to the findings included in the Order, prepared by Labrum, 
granting Labium's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Coet did however, correctly 
object to several facts asserted by Labrum in Labrum's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. 287-299.] The focus of this Court, regarding the trial 
court's granting of Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ought to be, did the trial 
court apply the law correctly and was Labrum entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
A court appropriately grants summary judgment "only when there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.. 2006 UT 37, | 12, 140 P.3d 1210 (quoting Swan Creek 
Vill. Homeowners Assfn v. Warne. 2006 UT 22, f 16,134 P.3d 1122); see also Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). Thus, this court should review the district couifs grant of partial summary 
judgment "for correctness, granting no deference to the district court." Id. (quoting Swan 
Creek. 2006 UT 22 at f 16, 134 P.3d 1122). 
Coet asserts that the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the relevant material facts 
and Labrum was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the award of attorneys 
fees and costs and the award of prejudgment interest. The trial court failed to properly apply 
the terms and conditions of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Accountants' Evaluation 
Agreement to the facts of the matter. 
B. The Accountants Evaluation Agreement Dealt Exclusively 
With Accounting-Type Issues and Did Not Modify The 
Terms And Conditions Of The Asset Purchase Agreement. 
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The Asset Sale Agreement entered into by the parties is clear and unambiguous. It is 
undisputed that the Asset Sale Agreement governed the sale of the Coet Chevrolet to Labrum 
Chevrolet. Included in the terms of the Asset Sale Agreement was a provision for attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
In the event any action or proceeding is taken or brought by either party 
concerning this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its 
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, whether such sums are expended with or 
without suit, at trial, or appeal or in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. 
[R. 416.] After the closing of the transaction for the purchase of the new motor vehicle 
dealership, disputations and claims arose between Coet and Labrum regarding the Asset Sale 
Agreement. [R. 324.] Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and the trial court's Order, Coet 
and Labrum entered into the Accountants Evaluation Agreement. [R. 81-86.] Coet asserts 
that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement was to resolve accounting-type issues that were 
among the disputations between Coet and Labrum relative to the Asset Sale Agreement. [R. 
74; 83-85; 319-322.] 
Both parties agree that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement is clear and 
unambiguous. See Labrum's Brief, pp. 20-21. The Accountants' Evaluation Agreement is 
a separate and distinct contract from the Asset Sale Agreement. The Asset Sale Agreement 
governed the sale of the new motor vehicle dealership. [R. 411-433.] The Accountants' 
Evaluation Agreement governed the alternative dispute resolution of certain accounting-type 
issues which arose from the sale of the new car dealership. [R. 73-79; 81-86.] Accountant 
Becky Taylor, selected by Coet and accountant Steven Racker, selected by Labrum, 
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comprised the Evaluation Team that entered into the Accountants Evaluation Agreement with 
Coet and Labrum to attempt to resolve the accounting-type issues in dispute. [R. 79.] The 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement did not incorporate, supercede, modify or change the 
terms and conditions or the rights of the parties provided in the Asset Sale Agreement. The 
Evaluation Team, after its investigation, came to the unanimous conclusion that Labrum 
owed Coet $59,384.79. [R. 104-106.] Labrum did not dispute the ultimate finding of the 
Evaluation Team. Acknowledging the Evaluation Team's determination, eventually, Labrum 
paid Coet $59,384.79. Moreover, Labrum has not disputed that based solely upon the 
Evaluation Team's conclusions, Coet is the prevailing party. So based upon the terms and 
conditions of the Asset Sale Agreement, Coet should be awarded his costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees expended to enforce the Asset Sale Agreement. 
However, Labrum asserts that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement precludes the 
Coet's right to attorneys' fees. The Accountants Evaluation Agreement mentions the Asset 
Sale Agreement to the extent the Accountants Evaluation Agreement was to resolve the 
disputes between the parties, as they related to accounting-type issues. [R. 73-79.] The 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement does not incorporate, supercede or modify the terms of 
the Asset Sale Agreement. The Accountants' Evaluation Agreement explains its objective. 
3. Objective of Evaluation. The Evaluation is intended by Coet and Labrum 
to be, and shall be conducted by the Evaluation Team as, an independent 
examination, assessment, and application of the relevant provisions of the 
Asset Sale Agreement and related documents, for the purpose of resolving all 
of the respective claims between the parties, with the exception of whether 
either party is legally responsible to the other party for parts obsolescence. 
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[R. 76]. The Evaluation Team was hired to determine accounting-type issues. The scope of 
the Evaluation Team's evaluation was limited to accounting-type issues that they 
unanimously agreed upon. They were not to determine anything else relative to the Asset 
Sale Agreement. 
The Accountants Evaluation Agreement also contains a claim preclusion paragraph 
upon which Labrum relies heavily. 
10. Preclusive Effect on Additional Claims. The parties acknowledge and 
agree that the claims raised in this letter agreement constitute all of the 
accounting-type claims for damages related to the Asset Sale Agreement and 
closing. The parties shall be precluded from raising or asserting (in the 
Lawsuit or otherwise) any claims for damages related to the Asset Sale 
Agreement and the Closing, except for: (I) any accounting issues that are not 
resolved by the Evaluation Team and (ii) any legal issues that must be resolved 
in order to achieve a complete resolution of the accounting issues specifically 
addressed in this Agreement. 
[R. 74] (emphasis added). Again, the terms contained in the Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement specify the area of accounting claims. This is appropriate and bargained-for by 
the parties, because the Evaluation Team are CPA's and their expertise is accounting and the 
specified areas to be evaluated were accounting-type issues. [R.76-79.] 
Labrum also emphasizes his argument on the release language contained in Paragraph 
9 in the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement. See Labium's Brief pp. 21-23. The release 
included in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement contains very broad, boiler-plate terms. 
[R. 74-75]. The breadth of the release in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement includes 
the accounting issues with which the Evaluation Team was working to resolve. [R. 74-75.] 
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Thus, the release language applicability should be limited to accounting-type issues 
enumerated by the parties. The Court should consider that the paragraphs with specific terms 
and conditions should be given more weight and consideration than the general, boiler-plate, 
and over-reaching paragraphs. See Docutel Olivetti Corp. V. Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 
475, 480 (Utah 1986) (Howe, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 203(c) for the rule that general terms of a contract are not given as 
much weight as specific terms). 
Additionally, Labrum argues that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement "acted as a 
partial modification or partial accord and satisfaction, of the Asset Sale Agreement." 
Labrum5s Brief, p. 31. Labium's argument that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement 
modifies the Asset Sale Agreement is incorrect. 
An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree that a 
different performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original 
agreement." Golden Key Realty. Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730,732 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). A party seeking to prove an accord and satisfaction must 
show (1) an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) 
a payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance 
of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. 
Marton Remodeling v. Jensen. 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985). Based upon Utah case 
law, Labium's argument that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement was an accord and 
satisfaction to the Asset Sale Agreement fails. The Accountants Evaluation Agreement was 
not an accord for the Asset Sale Agreement for the new motor vehicle dealership. It was an 
innovative attempt at alternative dispute resolution to resolve accounting-type disputes and 
494939.1 7 
save judicial resources. The terms and conditions in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement 
are separate and independent of the Asset Sale Agreement. Given that the Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement was not an accord and satisfaction for the Asset Sale Agreement, this 
Court need only look to the clear and unambiguous terms of the Asset Sale Agreement to 
determine that Coet maintained his bargained-for right for attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
to enforce the terms of the Asset Sale Agreement. 
This Court should give the trial court no deference and should look for correctness in 
its review of the trial court's Order granting Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The trial court erred in granting Labrum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
improperly applying terms contained in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement instead of 
the clear and unambiguous terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement. 
C. Labrum's Response Of "Put Everything on the Table" Failed 
to Harmonize The Conflicting Language Contained In The 
Four Corners Of The Accountants Evaluation Agreement. 
Labrum agrees that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
See Labrum's Brief p. 20-21. Labrum discounts the facially conflicting terms contained 
within the clear and unambiguous Accountants Evaluation Agreement. Labrum insists that 
the facially conflicting terms contained in the Accountants Evaluation Agreement are 
acceptable because, "everything needs to be put on the table and addressed or waived." [R. 
263.] Labrum persuaded the trial court to apply the conflicting terms to the undisputed facts, 
while concurrently failing to harmonize the conflicting terms. The trial court's application 
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of some of the conflicting terms lead directly to its erroneous granting of Labrum's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Accountants Evaluation Agreement is clear and unambiguous but contains 
provisions which conflict or are inharmonious with each other. The Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement was to provide authorization, direction and limitation to the Evaluation Team, 
pursuant to the trial court's Order, in attempting to resolve accounting issues in the case at 
bar. [R. 82 -86.] The predominant conflicting terms include: (1) the Evaluation Team was 
organized to evaluate and resolve accounting-type issues specifically listed, but also facially 
required to determine all issues, save for the general area of vehicle parts obsolescence [R. 
74]; and (2) requirements set forth that only accounting-type issues were to be addressed by 
the Evaluation Team, yet include an expansive boiler plate release clause not only 
unspecified accounting issues, but legal issues as well. [R. 74-75.] 
It is clear that the Evaluation Team was to address and attempt to resolve accounting-
type issues only. The trial court included in its Findings, that "the [trial] court conducted a 
telephonic scheduling conference on January 20, 2005. During the scheduling conference, 
the parties discussed the advantages of involving an accounting team to evaluate the 
accounting-type issues, in this case." [R.-324](Emphasis added). The Stipulated Case 
Management Order, stated in part, "based upon the directive of the Court, the parties 
stipulate and agree as follows, 
1. Submission of Accounting Disputes to Accounting Evaluation Team. 
The parties shall submit all accounting disputes, including all accounting issues 
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raised as part of the claims or counterclaims in this lawsuit, to an accounting 
evaluation team consistent with the terms of the parties' letter agreement, a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A". 
2. Pretrial Deadlines of Accounting Issues are Resolved by 
Accountant's Evaluation, If the accounting evaluation team is successfully 
above to resolve all accounting issues between the parties, leaving only legal 
issues (and accompanying factual background) for resolution by the court, then 
the following deadline shall apply: 
3. Pretrial Deadlines if One or More Accounting Issues are Note 
Resolved by Accountant's Evaluation. If the accounting evaluation team is 
not successfully able to resolve all accounting issues between the parties, 
leaving accounting issues as well as legal issues (and accompanying factual 
background) for resolution by the court, then the following deadlines shall 
apply: 
[R. 84-85.] This Case Management Order ("CMO") is in fact an order of the Court and holds 
the same authority as any order of the trial court. Labrum's assertion that the trial court did 
not order, direct and supervise the Evaluation Team and the Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement is misleading. See Labrum's Brief, pp. 27-29. "The fact is that the Court 
accommodated the parties' agreement to submit their claims under the evaluation terms but 
it certainly did not require it, beyond approving the parties' stipulated order." [R. 28.] 
Labrum's argument that some orders are different than other orders of the court is not only 
confusing but not based on law. The language of the CMO again reinforces the Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement. 
The CMO's reference to the Accountants Evaluation Agreement was appropriate 
wherein it states that the parties will submit their claims, "consistent with the parties' Letter 
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Agreement, a copy of which is attached at Exhibit "A." [R. 85.] The Court and the parties 
had agreed to deal with the accounting-type issues to the extent possible with the unresolved 
accounting-type issues and all legal issues to return to the Court for resolution at a later trial 
date. It is not an error nor did Coet "expressly waive or release" his right to attorneys' fees 
and costs pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement for the new motor vehicle dealership. 
Coet should receive his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to the Asset Sale 
Agreement, as the prevailing party for the time and activities between the execution of the 
Asset Sale Agreement and the finding of the Evaluation Teams. 
Additionally, Labrum argues that Paragraph 9, is a type of contract. See Labium's 
Brief, p. 21. Importantly, the release language is not by itself a contract. It is part of the 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement, and as such must be considered with the terms and 
conditions set forth in the four corners of the contract.1 Labrum wants this Court, like the 
trial court, to first ignore the terms and conditions of the Asset Sale Agreement and to 
consider only certain portions of the Accountants Evaluation Agreement, like the release 
language in its most expansive reading. Coet, however, petitions this Court to consider the 
terms of the Asset Sale Agreement and apply the entire Accountants Evaluation Agreement 
according to its terms, conditions and intent of the parties. Labrum argues that the 
1
 "[i]f the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties1 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 
50,Tf 17, 84P.3dll34. 
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Accountants Evaluation Agreement represents the parties' intent to put "everything on the 
table." See Labrum's Brief, p. 21. This representation is more than convenient, it is 
subterfuge. In the email cited by Labrum, prepared by Labrum's counsel to Coet's counsel 
and dated May 12,2004, Labrum represents that "everything needs to be put on the table and 
addressed or waived." [R. 263.] However, the context of the email represents the context of 
the discussions between counsel and later on with the Court, in that the issues for the 
Evaluation Team to resolve were concerning all accounting-type issues. [R. 263.] 
Labrum often repeats the argument that by the Accountant Evaluation Agreement, the 
parties agreed "to put everything on the table except for legal issues regarding the 
obsolescence parts." When in reality, what the parties were working toward was a way to 
get all the accounting-type issues on the table, getting both parties to focus and list what 
accounting-type issues existed between the parties and have the Evaluation Team attempt to 
resolve all the accounting-type issues it could, and send the remaining legal and unresolved 
accounting-type matters to be resolved by the trial court. It is quite simple. The Evaluation 
Team addressed and resolved all accounting-type issues that it could and left the remainder 
to the trial court. [R. 104-106.] Importantly, the trial court failed to harmonize the conflicting 
plain terms of the Accountants Evaluation Agreement. Labrum's arguments failed to 
establish that by putting everything (all accounting-type issues) on the table, the Evaluation 
Team would be able to resolve all issues, including legal issues such as denying any claims 
or attorneys fees and costs. 
494939.1 12 
D. Coet Did Not Waive Its Right To Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
By Not Expressly Reserving Them In The Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement 
Labrum first argued that the Accountants Evaluation Agreement was an accord and 
satisfaction. See Labrum's Brief, p. 31. Also in his brief, Labrum asserts that the 
Accountants Evaluation Agreement is a settlement agreement. See Labrum's Brief, p. 24. 
Labrum argues that as a matter of law, claims that are not expressly preserved in a settlement 
agreement are waived. Id. The Accountants Evaluation Agreement is not a settlement 
agreement. It is specifically an agreement, pursuant to a court order, to enlist two 
accountants to help resolve certain accounting-type disputes between the parties. It is not a 
settlement agreement. 
As such, Labrum's assertion that any claim not expressly made is expressly waived 
is incorrect. "Absent express language in the settlement agreement waiving the right to 
recover attorneys1 fees, the intent of the parties governs. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 
Chevrolet Div.. 722 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir.1983). In this action, the Accountants 
Evaluation Agreement is silent regarding Coet's right to recover fees and expenses. 
However, the Asset Sale Agreement2 explicitly provides for the award of attorneys' fees and 
costs. Moreover, neither the parties, nor the trial court, authorized the Evaluation Team to 
2
 When the intent of the parties to a contract is clearly ascertainable by construing the 
document from its four corners it is not considered ambiguous; although some terms may be 
conflicting, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible and rules of construction applicable to 
ambiguous contracts do not apply. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 862 
F.2d 796, 799 C.A.10 (Kan.),1988. 
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address or determine legal issues. It would be inappropriate to attempt to provide 
accountants the authority and the task of deciding legal issues such as the award of attorneys' 
fees and the amount. The award of attorneys' fees is a legal decision for the courts only,3 
"attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract." Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In this instance, attorney fees are provided for 
by the Asset Sale Agreement. Therefore, the trial court should have awarded fees, "in 
accordance with the terms of the contract" Id; see also Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, 
Tf 49, 158 P.3d 562. When looking at the four corners of the Accountants Evaluation 
Agreement, it is clear and unambiguous that the parties, with the trial court Order, 
determined that the Evaluation Team was to deal with accounting-type issues only and any 
mention or failure to mention legal issues is not an express waiver of any rights or claims. 
II. LABRUM FAILED TO ADDRESS COET'S ARGUMENT REGARDING 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL TO AWARD PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Labrum failed to make an argument against Coet's assertion that the trial court erred 
in denying Coet pre-judgment interest as set by Utah Code Ann. § 15-1 -1 et seq. When the 
trial court granted Labrum 5s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, a portion of the 
3
 "Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie 
State Bank v.Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,988 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). When determining 
what constitutes a reasonable award of attorney fees, the trial court should consider several 
factors, some of which include the amount of work actually performed and the amount of 
work "reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter." Id. at 989-90. Moore v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 101 , ! 53, 158 P.3d 562. 
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argument opposing the denial of statutory pre-judgment interest is the same for the denial of 
attorneys' fees, supra. Furthermore, Coet asserts that the parties did not stipulate, nor did the 
trial court provide, the authority to the Evaluation Team to determine both accounting and 
legal issues. An award of pre-judgment interest is based in statute and determined by a court, 
because it is a legal issue. "A trial court's decision to grant or deny pre-judgment interest 
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 
2003 UT 41, % 16, 82 P.3d 1064. 
A party is entitled to interest on past due money when both the amount due and 
the due date maybe ascertained. See Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 
1979). Utah courts have described the standard for determining whether a given 
damage award merits prejudgment interest: " ' [WJhere the damage is complete 
and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time... and 
not from the date of judgment.' " Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 
414,422 (Utah 1989) (alterations in original) (quoting First Sec. Bank of Utah 
v. J.B.J. Feedvards. Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)). 
Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, If 7, — P.3d -~ , 2007 WL 2007577 (Utah App.). 
The Accountants Evaluation Agreement does not state explicitly or imply that Coet 
waived his right to pre-judgment interest. An award of pre-judgment interest is based in 
statute. It would be contrary to Utah law for the Evaluation Team to determine the amount 
of pre-judgment interest to be awarded to Coet based upon his award of $59,384.79, because 
it is the responsibility of the court to determine the award of pre-judgment interest. Failure 
to request prejudgment interest prior to judgment is unnecessary because, '"the interest issue 
is injected by law into every action for the payment of past due money.'" Fitzgerald v. 
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Critohfield 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct App.1987) (quoting Lignell 593 P.2d at 809). 
Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, U 10, — P.3d —-, 2007 WL 2007577 (Utah App.); 
"Pre-judgment interest is properly awarded when a damage is complete, the loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time." Orlob 
v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt.. 2005 UT App. 430,135, 124 P.3d 269. 
III. COET IS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS ENTIRE MATTER. 
Labrum misstates the question at issue in this portion of the appeal by stating "the only 
relevant questions is: who is the prevailing party and therefore entitled to recover attorneys' 
fees and costs with respect to claims asserted after May 13, 2005?" Labrum's Brief, p. 30. 
Such an assertion misstates and oversimplifies the issues and disrespects the trial court 
by discounting its ability to exercise its discretion and judgment. The real issue is who is, 
the prevailing party in this matter, including all decisions and awards from the filing of the 
Complaint to final resolution, including the award of the Evaluation Team? 
As was argued before, the starting point for determining prevailing party is the net 
judgment rule. See Coet's Appellant Brief, pp. 28 - 35; see also Occidental/Nebraska Fed. 
Sav. Bank v. Meyer, 791 P.2d 217,221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Additionally, trial courts may 
also use "a flexible and reason approach." See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Guy, 2004 UT 47, K 11, 94 P.3d 270. The determining time frame regarding the 
determination of the prevailing party should be, which party prevailed from the onset of 
litigation to the final resolution of the matter. 
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The established case law already allows for the Court's discretion in determining the 
prevailing party. See Mvrah v. Campbell 2007 UT App 168, ffi[ 33-34, 163 P.3d 679. 
Labrum asserts that "it is extremely unworkable for trial courts to try to figure out who 
prevailed in negotiated settlement." See Labium's Brief, p. 32. Labium's general and over-
simplified analysis is inapplicable to the case at bar. This Court has already established that 
a trial court has discretion in taking into consideration all facts and awards in a matter in the 
"flexible and reasoned approach." See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy. 
2004 UT 47, U 11, 94 P.3d 270. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held, 
In certain circumstances, a court may easily determine which party is the 
prevailing party. For example, "[w]here a plaintiff sues for money damages, 
and plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant successfully 
defends and avoids adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed." R.T. Nielson 
Co. v. Cook. 2002 UT 11,123,40 P.3d 1119. Other circumstances, however, 
may require more complex analysis, such as when the case involves "multiple 
claims and parties," when the court awards "non-monetary relief to one or 
more parties, or when the "ultimate award of money damages does not 
adequately represent the actual success of the parties under the peculiar posture 
of the case." Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555 n. 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). When undertaking this more complex analysis, courts 
consider additional factors, including the following: (1) contractual language, 
(2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the 
parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their 
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the 
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. 
R.T. Nielson Co,, 2002 UT 11 at f 25, 40 P.3d 1119. 
Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, f 13, — P.3d — , 2007 WL 2007577 (Utah App.). 
In this particular case no settlement money exchanged hands until after the Complaint 
was filed. The trial court was well aware of the months of negotiation which occurred prior 
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to the entry of the CMO directing the parties to use the Evaluation Team to attempt to resolve 
accounting-type issues. [R. 45-63; 72; 82-86; 675, 199:12-16.] The trial court was well 
aware of the amount of settlement determined by the accounting team that Labrum owed 
Coet. Moreover, the trial court was also aware as to the reason of the settlement between 
Coet and Labrum prior to the litigation of the remaining issues. Labium's argument that the 
trial court was incapable of considering the award received by Coet through the alternative 
dispute resolution option of the Evaluation Team, insults the bench and the public policy in 
support of the flexible and reason approach established by A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating Guv. 2002 UT App 73, 47 P.3d 92. 
Labrum attempts to misguide this court with the argument that "the Resolution 
Agreement [Accountants Evaluation Agreement] acted as a partial modification, or partial 
accord in satisfaction, of the Asset Sale Agreement." See Labrum's Brief, p. 31. This 
assertion or description of the Accountants Evaluation Agreement is unsupported by the facts 
and by case law and is simply incorrect. The Asset Sale Agreement is the controlling 
document and pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed-upon therein, Coet is the 
prevailing party in this matter and should be awarded not only fees and costs for the entire 
matter from the filing of the Complaint until the final decree of this Court, but also receive 
an award of pre-judgment interest for the amount which has been paid and which will be paid 
to Coet by Labrum. 
IV. LABIUM'S UNSUPPORTED RELIANCE UPON COET'S ALLEGED 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
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Labium asserts that Coet's appeal relative to Labium's cause of action of fraud is a 
question of fact requiring Coet to marshal the evidence in order to overturn the trial court's 
error regarding its ruling that Coet made a material misrepresentation that the dealership did 
not have an obsolete parts problem. See Labrum's Brief, pp. 32-35. Labrum mistakes Coets' 
arguments. This issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its legal conclusion based 
upon the facts, that Labrum acted reasonably or not, in relying upon Coet's statement. 
Typically, the question of reasonable reliance is a question of fact, however, there are 
instances, like here, where courts may conclude that as a matter of law, there was no 
reasonable reliance. See Gold Standard, Inc. V. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 
1996). 
Labrum failed to meet the evidentiary standard for reasonable reliance. The trial court 
considered Labrum's wife's testimony. The court should have also considered (1) Labrum's 
experience in a new motor vehicle dealership's parts department; (2) Labrum's experience 
as a comptroller in the new motor vehicle; (3) Labrum's literal, physical inventory of the 
dealership's parts; (4) Labrum's unqualified access to the dealership's parts; and (5) his 
attestation, on two separate documents, to his satisfaction that there was at least $68,000.00 
worth of non-obsolete parts in the parts inventory. 
Moreover, a buyer of a business has certain duties. Labrum had to a duty to 
affirmatively investigate the business he was interested in purchasing. "[A] purchaser of a 
business is under a duty to investigate the financial condition of the business. Only a seller 
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of a business who is guilty of deliberately defrauding or misrepresenting the financial 
condition of a business who is liable therefor." See Paz, supra, 36 Lehigh L.J. at 436. See 
also Suraci v. Ball 160 Pa.Super. 349.352,51 A.2d404,406 (1947); Ashland Towson Corp. 
v. Kasunic, 110 Pa.Super. 496, 501, 168 A. 502, 503-04 (1933); and Bross v. Home 
Supermarket Grocery Co., 32 D. & C.2d 75,80 (Phia.Co. 1962)." In re Wright, 223 B.R. 886, 
896 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.,1998). The trial court questioned Labium's counsel about a buyer's 
duty to investigate. 
Q. [The Court] The other question that I had on the fraud issue is there is some 
case law in Utah that talks about the idea that when two parties engage - two 
sophisticated parties, which these apparently are when it comes to the issue of 
car dealerships, engage in a transaction - in an arm's length transaction, the 
parties can't simply accept at face value things that are told to them. They 
have a duty to investigate. Do you believe that the case law would be 
applicable here where obsolete parts is clearly a recognized issue in August of 
2001. Your client has three months to look into this question. He's a 
sophisticated party. He does the parts inventory. It seems to me that he may 
have that duty to find out before he closed. 
[R. 674,184:15-185:1.] Labrum's response avoided answering what Labrum's duty entailed, 
but focused upon some possible difficulties Labrum may have experienced had he tried. [R. 
674, 185:2-186:16.] Simply put, Labrum failed to meet his duty. 
Additionally, Mr. Coet's testimony provided a more complete picture of what 
occurred in the late hours, while Mr. Labrum and three family members were conducting an 
inventory of the dealership's parts. [R. 674, 185:18-24.] 
Q. And did you in fact, did you and Mr. Labrum complete the parts inventory 
that night? 
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A. [Mr. Coet] We reached a point at which time Mr. Labrum says, "How do 
you feel about the parts count, Larry?" I said, "Danny," I said, "That's totally 
up to you. It's your money." He said, "Well, I feel satisfied." He said, "Let's 
call it a close." 
Q. So did you terminate the parts counting? Were there still parts left to - -
A. There were still some parts left, yes. 
Q. Okay. At that time, Mr. Coet, approximately if you can recall, what did 
your books show as far as the parts inventory? 
A. Approximately a little over $79,000.00 in parts. 
Q. Okay. Did you put any pressure at all on Mr. Labrum to terminate the parts 
inventory that night? 
A. No. 
[R.674, 21:14-22:3]. It appears more than upon reliance of Mr. Coet's alleged stated 
assurance, that Mr. Labrum knew that he had reached the $68,000.00 parts inventory 
threshold as provided in the Asset Sale Agreement. After conducting the parts inventory for 
several hours with family and Coet, Labrum was satisfied and terminated the inventory of 
his own accord. [R. 674, 185:18-24.] 
The trial court appropriate question Labrum's counsel regarding his claim of 
reasonable reliance. 
Now let me turn to the obsolete parts. 
THE COURT: Let me just be clear on that question. In the absence of fraud, 
you would agree that there was no adjustment made for obsolete parts at the 
closing either. 
MR. CALL: In the absence of fraud or misrepresentation there was no 
adjustment made for obsolete parts. I agree. 
THE COURT: And you would have no cause of action. 
MR. CALL: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: You would have no cause of action. 
MR. CALL: Absent defraud or misrepresentation and omission that's 
absolutely true, your honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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[R.674,182:21-183:7.] Based upon the standard set in Gold Standard, Inc. V. Getty Oil Co., 
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996), this Court can determine the trial court erred in its legal 
conclusion as a matter of law that there was no reasonable reliance by Mr. Labrum on Mr. 
Coet's alleged representations. 
V. THE 1992 FORD TRUCK WAS INCLUDED ON THE USED VEHICLE 
INVENTORY LIST, BUT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PURCHASE 
PRICE PAID BY LABRUM, 
Labrum did not pay Coet for a certain 1992 Ford truck. The issue was presented at 
trial and framed by the trial court as, "this issue turns on whether the truck was, in the seller's 
inventory at the time of closing and previously titled." [R. 674,196:6-8.] The issue, properly 
phrased is, was, did Laburm pay Coet for the 1992 Ford truck, with the payment for the used 
car inventory? 
The facts regarding the 1992 Ford truck and how it came to be on the dealership 
premises on the closing date have been well documented in the previous briefs. It is 
undisputed that the 1992 Ford truck was on the dealership premises at the time of the closing. 
It is also undisputed that the 1992 Ford truck was listed on the inventory list of used vehicles. 
It is also undisputed that Labrum paid Coet $290,275.00 for the used vehicle inventory. [R. 
353.] 
The issue on appeal is, did Coet receive compensation for the 1992 Ford truck? The 
answer is no. Notwithstanding Labmm's argument that "[i]t is irrelevant whether each used 
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car in inventory was assigned a separate and definite price,4" the parties agreed upon a set 
price for each used car in inventory. The set price agreed to by Coet and Labrum, evidence 
by Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, was the total amount Labrum offered and the amount included in 
the final purchase price. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 2 and 3. Labrum inspected each used 
vehicle on the lot and offered a bid price. [R. 344; Plaintiffs Ex. 10.] Labrum did not 
inspect and make a bid for the 1992 Ford truck. The reason he did not make a bid for the 
1992 Ford truck is because it was not on physically on the dealership premises to be 
appraised. The truck had not yet been delivered to the dealership. The 1992 Ford truck was 
delivered on November 13, 2001. [R. 674, 85:18-23.] Labrum, with Coet observing, made 
the physical inventory of the used vehicles on November 12, 2001. [R. 674, 34:16-25.] 
Adding up the individual prices offered by Labrum for all the used vehicles, save the 
1992 Ford truck, equals $290,275.00, the amount Labrum paid Coet for the used vehicle 
inventory. Labrum did not pay Coet for the 1992 Ford truck. 
The trial court concluded that "the 1992 Ford truck was in the sellers inventory at the 
time of closing." [R. 674, 196:14-15.] Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court 
erred in its determination, in that while the 1992 Ford truck was included on the list of used 
vehicles, it was not inspected nor bid upon by Labrum, nor included in the purchase price of 
the used vehicle inventory. 
4
 Labrum's Brief, p. 37. 
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VI. THIS COURT SHOULD INSTRUCT THE TRIAL COURT TO 
INCLUDE COET'S ATTORNEYS' FEES, INCLUDING THOSE 
INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
It is expected for this Court to reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to 
determine the appropriate amount of costs, attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest Mr. 
Labrum owes Mr. Coet. Mr. Coet has incurred additional attorneys' fees in filing and 
briefing his appeal to uphold the terms of the Asset Sale Agreement. Therefore, this Court 
should include in its instructions to the trial court, to include attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in the appellate process to the remainder of the matter and pay Mr. Coet. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, as the detailed analysis above and in Coet's Appellant's and Reply 
Briefs establish, the trial court erred on several issues in the resolution of the disputes 
between Coet and Labrum. The trial court erred in its holding that Coet waived his right to 
attorneys' fees, costs and pre-judgment interest in the Accountants' Evaluation Agreement; 
Labrum was the "prevailing party" at the conclusion of the bench trial; Labrum's detrimental 
reliance on Coet's remark regarding the obsolete parts and the determination of the 
ownership issue relative to the 1992 Ford truck. 
Coet respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand this matter to the trial 
court with instructions to enter an order: (1) for an award to Coet for his attorneys' fees and 
costs; and/or (2) for an award to Coet for pre-judgment interest on his award as determined 
by the Evaluation Team; and/or (3) holding Coet as the prevailing party regarding the entire 
494939.1 24 
matter; and/or (4) find that Labrum failed to meet the elements and standard of proof for 
fraud relative to the parts inventory obsolescence and/or (5) for the trial court to reconsider 
the ownership status of the 1992 Ford pickup; and/or (6) the repayment, with applicable 
interest, the monies paid by Coet to Labrum pursuant to the trial court's Order. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of September, 2007. 
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